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This article studies the importance of structural unemployment in the Croatian labour
market via occupational mismatch between vacancies and unemployment in the per-
iod 2004–2011. The matching function which incorporates the effect of occupational
mismatch on the ﬂow of ﬁlled vacancies is used for the aggregate market as well as
for different submarkets based on the grouping of similar occupations. It appears that
occupational mismatch does not have an impact on the aggregate ﬂow of ﬁlled
vacancies. The portion of total unemployment that can be attributed to occupational
mismatch is estimated to be only up to 6%, while the portion of unemployment
attributed to mismatch in different submarkets varies greatly.
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Croatia
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1. Introduction
Croatia is among those countries which have experienced tremendous changes in their
labour markets after the collapse of the former socialist system and the transformation
to a market economy. This period of rapid structural change in all areas of the economy
was characterised by the slow adjustment of the skills structure of the workforce. Never-
theless, even in the transition economies it was expected that after the initial fall in the
employment rate, the emergence of new (private) ﬁrms would reverse the process.1
However, this was for the large part halted by the extremely low mobility of workers
across different occupations, industries, and locations (Boeri, 2000). Brixiova, Li, and
Yousef (2009) further emphasise that skill shortages in Central and East Europe (CEE)
serve as the most important obstacle to faster labour reallocation and convergence to the
EU-15 employment structures.
Schioppa (1991), on the other hand, states how many studies show that those countries
which are the least ﬂexible in matching their unemployed with available vacancies are
actually those that have persistently high unemployment rates. According to Schioppa,
labour market mismatch is usually the consequence of inadequate education and training
or insufﬁcient geographical and occupational labour mobility (1991). Therefore, this arti-
cle starts from the premise that the reason for high and persistent unemployment in Croatia
is the shortage of adequate skills in the labour market, i.e. skills and knowledge of the
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labour force supply do not match the skills and knowledge that employers seek (demand).
This means that the highest portion of unemployment in Croatia is structural unemploy-
ment. Thus, the main research question is to what extent can the existing level of unem-
ployment be attributed to structural/occupational mismatch or by how much would
unemployment fall were structural balance to be achieved?
In order to investigate this, the matching function approach is used by adopting a
model ﬁrst introduced in Dur (1999). The model estimates the matching function that
explicitly incorporates the effect of mismatch instead of adding an arbitrary mismatch
index into the matching function. However, in this article the matching process is
assumed not to be the same across submarkets. One of the limitations of the educational
mismatch study by Dur (1999) is that it estimates only the aggregate matching function
that covers the entire labour market.2 This study estimates, besides the aggregate func-
tion, the disaggregated matching functions, based on the grouping of (similar) occupa-
tions, that explicitly incorporate the mismatch index for different submarkets. Also, this
study uses occupations as a proxy for skills instead of the educational levels used in
Dur (1999). This is justiﬁed on the grounds that occupations typically deﬁne the skill
requirements of a vacancy and they characterise the skills of a job-seeker much better
than the level of education. Furthermore, this is one of the ﬁrst studies that tries to esti-
mate the existence of the occupational mismatch in the Croatian labour market and thus
should provide valuable policy information. Namely, the assumption that the main
source of high and persistent unemployment in Croatia is incongruity between supply
and demand in the labour market is not new; it is something used on a daily basis for
political purposes. However, rigorous empirical testing is missing. The results of this
study could also be important for other transition economies since the attributes inher-
ited from the previous system as well as the roads of transition and joining the EU
were, to some extent, similar for all CEE countries.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the background for the topic
by explaining the importance of structural unemployment with emphasis on transition
countries. Additionally, this section outlines the main issues in the Croatian labour mar-
ket and gives the description of the data used in the subsequent analysis. In section 3, a
short description of the model adopted from Dur (1999) is given while section 4 pro-
vides estimation results together with the relative importance of occupational mismatch
for Croatian unemployment in the period 2004–2011. Section 5 concludes.
2. Background and data description
2.1. Structural unemployment
The structural imbalance or mismatch entails a situation in which the characteristics of
unemployed workers, particularly in terms of skills, work experience or location, differ
from those of the jobs that are available (Jackman & Roper, 1987, p. 10). In other
words, there is a mismatch between vacant jobs and unemployed workers such that if
the latter were available with different skills and/or in different places the level of unem-
ployment would fall (Turvey, 1977, p. 210).3 But, why would this represent a problem?
Sattinger (1993), for instance, shows that the quality of a job match determines the pro-
ductivity level and earnings in a job. Barcena-Martín, Santiago Budría, and Moro-Egido
(2012), on a sample of European university graduates, further show that the mismatched
earn on average 11.7% less than their well-matched counterparts. Evidently, mismatch of
skills, whether vertical (mismatch in the level of education) or horizontal (mismatch in the
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type of education), can be a source of unemployment in the labour market. This is con-
ﬁrmed in several empirical studies, predominantly for the US labour market.4
Increased presence of mismatch in transition countries is the result of signiﬁcant
changes during the 1990s in the structure of product markets, which have led to changes
in the structure of labour demand, that were not aligned with the labour supply (Obadić,
2005). Furthermore, the persistence of structural unemployment could be caused by fac-
tors such as deterioration of human capital of the unemployed or a negative perception
of the unemployed on the part of the potential employers (Šergo, Poropat, & Gržinić,
2009). Yet, although important, studies on skill, educational or occupational mismatch
in former transition countries are scarce. This is primarily a result of the lack of ade-
quate data (Kucel, Vilalta-Buﬁ, & Robert, 2011). In addition, most of the studies that
exist in this area usually cover school-to-work transition, sometimes differentiating
between vertical and horizontal mismatch (see, for instance, Farčnik & Domadenik,
2012; Kogan & Unt, 2005; Roberts, 1998). However, several recent studies on the tran-
sition from centrally planned economy towards market economy shed important insights
on how the mismatch could have developed in some of these countries (Bartlett, 2012;
Jeong, Kejak, & Vinogradov, 2008; Kucel et al., 2011; Lamo & Messina, 2010).
The problem of structural unemployment in Croatia is tackled by, for example, Obadić
(2006a, 2006b), where via calculation of regional mismatch she indicates the existence of
structural unemployment due to mismatch between the demand in the labour market and
the location of workers seeking employment. Botrić (2011), on the other hand, tries to
explain the basic determinants of structural unemployment in the countries of Southeast
Europe, and suggests that a high ﬁscal burden, the overall restructuring of the economy
and remittances are primary determinants of high structural unemployment in the region.
However, the only paper, until recently, that tried to estimate some kind of skills mismatch
for Croatia is the one by Obadić (2005). In the paper, she estimates disaggregated match-
ing functions according to qualiﬁcation level and economic activity for Croatia in the per-
iod 1992(98)–2002. She shows that in qualiﬁcations such as skilled and highly-skilled,
secondary-school level and non-university level, there is excess of both supply and
demand for labour, i.e. a mismatch. As far as economic activities are concerned, there is a
mismatch in the manufacturing industry, wholesale and retail trade, and other social and
personal service activities. Matković (2011), in his recent work, indicates that there exists
horizontal mismatch in the Croatian labour market between ﬁeld of education and acquired
job (occupation).
Currently, the labour market in Croatia is characterised by low activity, low employ-
ment, and high unemployment rates. This indicates a lack of ﬂexibility of the Croatian
labour market, but also internal structural problems. This situation is not only the conse-
quence of the ongoing economic and ﬁnancial crisis; it is a constant process ever since
the collapse of the socialist system at the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, there is
much heterogeneity among the participants in the labour market in Croatia. Employment
and unemployment by region reveal that there are signiﬁcant regional disparities (Tomić,
in press). The same holds for differences in skills, occupations or sectors of economic
activity. The bulk of the unemployed population in Croatia is composed of people with
one to three-year vocational secondary school education, followed by people with four-
year vocational secondary and grammar school education and those with only elemen-
tary school education. The share of those who have not completed elementary school is
decreasing, whilst the share of those with higher education is increasing, especially after
the beginning of the crisis in the second half of 2008.
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2.2. Data
The data used in this article are monthly data from the Croatian (public) Employment
Service (CES) on: (1) the number of registered unemployed persons (U); (2) the number
of reported vacancies (V); and (3) the number of employed persons from the Service
registry (M) in the period from January 2004 until December 2011. Apart from the
exceptionally large number of the unemployed, the employment records from the
Service are generally slightly higher than the reported vacancies in the same month.
However, this is expected given that since 2002 employers were no longer legally
obliged to report vacancies to the CES. The CES states that after 2004 all the transi-
tional effects of changes in legal obligations on reporting vacancies were no longer
visible (CNB, 2010). However, the vacancy series in this article are based only on
vacancies posted at the CES during the respective months.5
To be able to detect the existence of mismatch in the labour market, all variables are
divided according to the nine broad occupational groups:6 (1) Legislators, senior ofﬁ-
cials and managers; (2) Professionals; (3) Technicians and associate professionals; (4)
Clerks; (5) Service workers and shop and market sales workers; (6) Skilled agricultural
and ﬁshery workers; (7) Craft and related trades workers; (8) Plant and machine opera-
tors and assemblers; and (9) Elementary occupations.
Even though skills mismatch is usually examined via educational groups (for
instance, Dur, 1999), due to unavailability of that kind of data for vacancies and number
of hires, we decided to analyse structural unemployment in Croatia via occupational
mismatch. In the context of the Croatian labour market, as well as its economic and
educational structure, we believe that occupational (mis)match may provide even better
information. Fahr and Sunde (2001), for example, argue how separating labour markets
by occupations allows looking at the relevant comparable measures for ﬂows and
stocks, supporting their argument with evidences which suggest that virtually all job-
seekers stay within their profession (occupation) which is not true for the industry or
region. In addition, the same authors explain how occupation usually deﬁnes the skill
requirements of vacancy and characterises the skill of a person which may point to bet-
ter matching quality in searching for a job (Fahr & Sunde, 2002). Additionally, the level
of education is usually the same in a speciﬁc occupational group (Table 1), which
means that the use of occupation categories as a proxy for skills is justiﬁable in this
case. Evidently, information on job openings by occupation is not important only for
those looking for jobs, but also for those considering education and training options and
for policymakers (Shah & Burke, 2001).
The assumption here is that each of the occupations represents a separate submarket
in the overall labour market. Namely, this assumption implies that jobs within each sub-
market are reasonably homogeneous but across submarkets differ signiﬁcantly, so that
job-seekers in one speciﬁc submarket (occupation) never apply for a job in any other
submarket (occupation), and vice versa. Even in the absence of structural imbalance, the
unemployment rate is usually not equal to the vacancy rate in aggregate or in any par-
ticular submarket so we measure occupational mismatch relative to the existing aggre-
gate levels of unemployment and vacancies in the economy. CES data show that in the
case of low-skilled workers (elementary occupations) the share of the unemployed in
total unemployment is higher than the proportion of vacancies in this occupation in rela-
tion to the total vacancies. On the other hand, in the case of highly skilled workers
(professionals), the share of vacancies is higher than the proportion of the unemployed.
In some other professions (for example, technicians and associate professionals), these
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shares are actually very similar. Clearly, one could say that there exists a mismatch
between supply (the unemployed) and demand (vacancies) in some of the submarkets,
while in others there is no visible mismatch.
However, the share of some submarkets (occupations) in the total number of both
vacancies and unemployment is too small7 to be able to bring any strong conclusions.
In addition, some of these occupations are too distinct from each other and the labour
(sub)markets probably function in a completely different way. Therefore, we have
grouped these nine occupations into two main categories:
(1) white-collar occupations that includes legislators, senior ofﬁcials and managers;
professionals; technicians and associate professionals; and clerks, and
(2) blue-collar occupations that includes service workers and shop and market sales
workers; skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers; craft and related trades work-
ers; plant and machine operators and assemblers; and elementary occupations.
The empirical analysis will be conducted for these two submarkets separately in
order to account for possible differences in the functioning of the labour market (includ-
ing the matching process) for different (more similar) groups of occupations.
3. Empirical strategy
The model in this article is based on procedure introduced in Dur (1999) which actually
stems from the paper by Jackman and Roper (1987).
It all starts with the concept of the matching function. Hujer, Blien, Caliendo, and
Zeiss (2002) explain how the matching process actually serves as a proxy for the
Table 1. Relation between occupational and educational groups of unemployed – 2011.
Occupation/education
No school/
uncompleted basic
school
Basic
school
Secondary
school
Non-
university
college
University/
postgraduate
degrees
Legislators, senior
ofﬁcials and
managers
0.5% 3.8% 44.3% 19.2% 32.2%
Professionals 0.2% 0.2% 17.6% 12.8% 69.2%
Technicians and
associate
professionals
0.2% 0.9% 72.6% 22.3% 3.9%
Clerks 0.4% 4.2% 91.9% 2.3% 1.2%
Service workers and
shop and market
sales w.
1.2% 13.3% 84.9% 0.5% 0.2%
Skilled agricultural
and ﬁshery workers
6.5% 24.5% 68.6% 0.3% 0.1%
Craft and related
trades workers
3.3% 19.2% 77.3% 0.1% 0.0%
Plant and machine
operators and
assemblers
5.4% 30.1% 64.2% 0.2% 0.1%
Elementary
occupations
17.8% 55.7% 26.3% 0.2% 0.1%
Source: Author’s calculations based on CES data.
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differences in the geographic and skill characteristics between the vacant jobs and the
job-seekers:
Mi ¼ f ðUi;ViÞ; (1)
where M denotes the number of successful matches, U represents the number of unem-
ployed, V is the number of vacancies, while the coefﬁcient i indicates the occupation in
this case.
The above expression is often written in the form of a Cobb-Douglas function:
Mi ¼ kUai V bi ; (2)
where k indicates the efﬁciency of the labour market, and α and β are the coefﬁcients of
(partial) elasticities that indicate the relative importance of supply (U) and demand (V)
in the labour market.
As mentioned before, it is assumed that the aggregate labour market consists of a
number of completely separable submarkets differentiated by the type of occupation.
This means that job-seekers belonging to occupation i cannot (or do not) search for a
job in any other occupation. The same goes for vacancies – a vacancy that belongs to
occupation i is never ﬁlled by a job-seeker that belongs to some other occupation. Thus,
the aggregate matching function is just the sum of the matching functions across the
whole labour market:
M ¼
X
i
Mi ¼ kU aV b
X
i
Ui
U
 a Vi
V
 b
: (3)
Equation 3 shows that the aggregate number of ﬁlled vacancies (matches) depends on
the stocks of aggregate unemployment and vacancies, the efﬁciency parameter k and the
distribution of unemployment and vacancies over submarkets (occupations).
The term
P
i ðUiU Þ
aðViV Þb in expression 3 is equal to one if, for each submarket (occu-
pation) i, the share of the unemployed that belongs to the submarket i in aggregate
unemployment (Ui/U) is equal to the share of vacancies belonging to the submarket i in
aggregate vacancies (Vi/V). If this term is actually equal to one, i.e. the labour market
situation is equally (un)favourable in each submarket, it is called perfect structural
balance (Dur, 1999; based on Jackman & Roper, 1987). The difference between actual
unemployment (U) and unemployment in perfect structural balance (US) represents an
indicator of mismatch in the labour market. From equation 3 this difference equals to:8
U  US ¼ U  1
X
i
Ui
U
 a Vi
V
 b !
¼ U  mm; (4)
where mm represents the mismatch indicator that can be interpreted as the share of total
unemployment that can be attributed to mismatch. Obviously, the importance of mismatch
on the overall level of unemployment depends on the distribution of both unemployment
and vacancies over submarkets (occupations), but also on the size of the particular submar-
ket. This means that if both U and V are high in one submarket and low in another, shifting
the unemployed from the ﬁrst submarket to the second one does not tremendously increase
the number of matches, or that relatively high unemployment and low vacancies in a quite
small submarket leads to only a moderately higher level of mm (Dur, 1999). Based on this
expression, one can observe how equation 3 represents the matching function that incorpo-
rates the effect of occupational mismatch on the (aggregate) ﬂow of ﬁlled vacancies.
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In order to estimate how much of (total) unemployment can be attributed to
occupational mismatch in the period January 2004–December 2011, we use the
matching function derived in the equation 3. Its empirical counterpart looks like the
following:
logMt ¼ const: þ
X
j
kj log kj;t1 þ a logUt1 þ b logVt
þ ð1 nÞ log
X
i
Ui;t1
Ut1
 a Vi;t
Vt
 b
þet; (5)
where index t is introduced in order to distinguish between different time periods
(months). The error term is assumed to have all the usual characteristics.
Parameter kt in equation 5 represents a set of variables that might affect the search
behaviour of both the unemployed and employers, i.e. the efﬁciency of the matching
process. In this case, we use (linear) time trend to account for changes in search behav-
iour related to unobserved characteristics. In addition, we use the share of the number
of users of unemployment beneﬁts in total unemployment, a variable that should affect
the search behaviour of the unemployed.9
4. Estimation results
The model in this article is estimated using non-linear least squares (NLS) estimation,
but because of possible simultaneity, we also estimate the model using nonlinear two-
stage least squares instrumental variable (TSLS IV) estimation, treating the unemploy-
ment, vacancies and the share of the number of users of unemployment beneﬁts in total
unemployment as endogenous. In addition to exogenous and lagged endogenous vari-
ables as additional instruments we use logs of the index of construction works, the share
of the average net in the average gross wage and the spread between interest rates on
short-term loans for enterprises and interest rates on foreign currency deposits for enter-
prises.10
Furthermore, since these are relatively high frequency data, controlling for seasonal
variation seems particularly important. Therefore, estimations include monthly dummies
to control for differentiated vacancies and outﬂows throughout each year. Given that we
have data on the ﬂow of ﬁlled vacancies by occupations, we estimate the matching
function not only on the aggregate level, but also for each of the submarkets deﬁned in
the previous section – white-collar and blue-collar occupations – using the same
approach as for the aggregate function. Additionally, since the model assumes constant
returns to scale we present here only the restricted (α + β = 1) model speciﬁcation
(Table 2). First, let us discuss the results for the aggregate function.
At ﬁrst glance, it seems that there are no major differences between NLS and IV
estimation. For both the NLS and TSNLS IV estimation the coefﬁcient of elasticity (α)
for the unemployment is larger than the coefﬁcient of elasticity for vacancies (β) which
means that ﬁrms are less successful in ﬁnding workers than workers in ﬁnding jobs.
The reason for this may be the limitation in labour supply, mismatch, the asymmetry of
information, etc. Additionally, for both the NLS and TSNLS IV estimation, the coefﬁ-
cient for the incorporated mismatch index (equation 4) seems to be insigniﬁcantly differ-
ent from its theoretical value of one. Finally, the share of the users of unemployment
beneﬁts in total unemployment has a signiﬁcant negative impact on the matching pro-
cess, while time trend signiﬁcantly positively affects matching process.11
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Still, more interesting results occur if we look at the disaggregated functions, i.e. dif-
ferent submarkets based on similar groups of occupations. In all the cases (submarkets)
results are largely similar to those for the aggregate function. The differences mainly lie
in the size of the elasticity coefﬁcients (in the market for white-collar occupations there
is somewhat smaller weight on the unemployment) or the coefﬁcient for the time trend
(slightly higher for white-collar occupations or slightly lower for blue-collar occupa-
tions). The share of the users of unemployment beneﬁts among unemployed negatively
affects the matching process in both disaggregated markets.
However, the main difference lies in the coefﬁcient for the mismatch indicator. For
instance, it seems that in the market for white-collar occupations, the occupational mis-
match index signiﬁcantly positively12 affects the process of matching, while in the mar-
ket for blue-collar occupations this index has a negative (insigniﬁcant) impact. This
ﬁnding suggests that perhaps due to the speciﬁc distribution of both unemployment and
vacancies over different submarkets and due to the size of each particular submarket,
the mismatch index proves to be insigniﬁcant (and positive) on the aggregate level
while it has different (opposite) effects in the submarkets for white- and blue-collar
occupations. This result supports the logic behind the estimation of the disaggregated
matching functions in this article. Evidently, the labour market for white-collar and
blue-collar occupations operates on different postulates.13
As previously mentioned, there has been a recession in Croatia since the second half
of 2008 which has caused a huge rise in unemployment. In order to see whether the cri-
sis may have caused some of the (unusual) results in our estimations, we estimate the
(restricted) models again for two different sub-periods: 2004–2007 and 2008–2011
(Table 3). Although the sample is now much smaller we can observe some differences
between the two sub-periods. For instance, time trend is signiﬁcant (and positive) for
the blue-collar occupations as well as for the aggregate market only in the second sub-
period (2008–2011) while for the white-collar occupational submarket the opposite is
true. The coefﬁcient for the incorporated mismatch index is not signiﬁcant in any of the
presented cases, although it suggests a positive impact on the matching process while
Table 2. Estimation results for the restricted estimation.
Aggregate function White-collars Blue-collars
NLS TSNLS NLS TSNLS NLS TSNLS
α 0.815*** 0.849*** 0.733*** 0.611*** 0.850*** 0.926***
(15.563) (11.839) (13.101) (7.887) (11.316) (8.285)
β 0.185 0.151 0.267 0.389 0.150 0.074
( – ) ( – ) ( – ) ( – ) ( – ) ( – )
ξ -1.180 -1.739 -1.307** -1.733*** 1.987 7.793
(-1.418) (-1.375) (-2.362) (-3.873) (0.415) (0.407)
time trend 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002***
(5.958) (5.197) (7.704) (6.801) (3.063) (2.843)
unben -1.382*** -1.355*** -1.602*** -1.108*** -1.335*** -1.454***
(-4.479) (-3.853) (-5.155) (-3.224) (-3.291) (-2.989)
constant -5.094*** -5.171*** -4.798*** -3.608*** -5.316*** -5.779***
(-9.032) (-7.285) (-8.689) (-5.281) (-6.592) (-5.380)
R2 0.911 0.910 0.824 0.814 0.920 0.917
Notes: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. t-statistics is in parentheses. unben – natural logarithm of the share
of the users of unemployment beneﬁts in total unemployment. Monthly dummies are statistically signiﬁcant,
detailed results available upon request. NLS – non-linear least squares. TSNLS – two-stage NLSs.
Source: Author’s calculations based on CES data.
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the share of the users of unemployment beneﬁts in total unemployment has a signiﬁcant
(negative) effect only in the labour market for white-collars. In addition, in almost all of
the estimations the coefﬁcient for the unemployment (α) is smaller than in the original
model speciﬁcation (Table 2).
Additionally, by using the estimated parameters from equation 3 we can determine
how much of total unemployment can be attributed to occupational mismatch. The mis-
match index (equation 4) for the aggregate function is calculated with the estimated
coefﬁcients of elasticity from the TSNLS IV restricted estimation for February 2004–
December 2011 period (column 2 in Table 1) and is illustrated in Figure 1 (left-hand
side).
The ﬁgure clearly shows that occupational mismatch explains only 1% to 6% of
total unemployment,14 with signiﬁcant variability (seasonality) of the index. This result,
together with regression estimations in Table 2, suggests that occupational mismatch is
not very important for the high and persistent (aggregate) unemployment in Croatia.
The right-hand side of Figure 1 shows unemployment attributed to occupational mis-
match as a percentage of the labour force, which is calculated as the mismatch indicator,
mm, multiplied by the unemployment rate, u. It is observable that the two indicators
(relative and absolute) follow a similar trend, which implies that in the period when the
unemployment rate was high, the mismatch index was also high, and vice versa. What’s
more, this pattern suggests that the mismatch indicator is counter-cyclical, i.e. it
increases during recessions and decreases during booms. But again, it needs to be
pointed out that occupational mismatch is not very important for the overall unemploy-
ment in Croatia. According to these results, if structural balance were achieved, i.e. if
there were no mismatch between unemployment and vacancies in the labour market, the
unemployment rate would fall by roughly 0.2 to 0.8 percentage points.
As far as the mismatch indicator, mm, for each of the submarkets is concerned, there
is again great (monthly) variability in the indicator in every submarket, together with
signiﬁcant difference across two different submarkets. In the case of white-collar work-
ers the indicator explains between 2% and 20% of total white-collar unemployment, but
only up to 1% for blue-collar occupations. Once again, the results show remarkable dif-
ference between the functioning of the labour market for white- and blue-collar occupa-
tions in Croatia. Unfortunately, data on the size of the workforce by occupations do not
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Figure 1. Share of total unemployment attributed to occupational mismatch (left) and unemploy-
ment attributed to occupational mismatch as a percentage of the labour force (right).
Notes: mm – mismatch index.
Source: Author’s calculations based on CES data.
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 355
exist so it was impossible to check how much of the unemployment as a percentage of
the labour force is attributed to occupational mismatch for each of the occupational
groups (submarkets).
It needs to be pointed out that there are several possible shortcomings of this study.
First of all, the number of vacancies used in the analysis is not the total number of open
positions in a given month. If the extent of non-posting of vacancies were uniform
across submarkets, our mismatch index would be unaffected (Dur, 1999). However, it is
not very likely that this holds in reality.
Another problem concerns the variables used as instruments in the TSNLS estima-
tion. Namely, this article uses same variables as instruments for all the submarkets
(occupational groups) as for the aggregate market. However, variables that proved to be
good instruments for the aggregate market may not be as good for the analysed submar-
kets. Thus, the obtained results should be taken with caution. Furthermore, since endog-
enous variables (especially unemployment) exhibit huge persistency throughout the
observed period lagged endogenous variables perhaps would not serve as sufﬁcient
instruments. That is why we checked whether endogenous variables transformed by
within-transformation or ﬁrst-differenced endogenous variables as instruments would
provide better results; however, the outcome shows rather similar results as when the
lagged endogenous variables served as instruments (see Table A.5 in Appendix).
Furthermore, since it has already been shown that there exists a regional mismatch
in the Croatian labour market (Obadić, 2006a, 2006b), the model could be controlled
for (possible) regional mismatch.15 This is done by estimating the model using the data
for occupational distribution of unemployment and vacancies on a NUTS2 level in
Croatia16 but both ﬁxed-effects panel estimation as well as regular NLS estimation with
regional dummies models show that the regional effects are not signiﬁcant (see
Table A.4 in Appendix). Additionally, the original model (Dur, 1999) assumes the func-
tion exhibits constant returns to scale. Nevertheless, this is not true in all cases in this
article (especially in the case of blue-collar occupations). That is why some of the
results might be biased (for instance, the calculation of the portion of total unemploy-
ment due to occupational mismatch in the market for blue-collars).
Finally, the choice of nine broad occupational groups can give rise to doubt if we
consider two questions: (1) is it detailed enough to provide important information on the
(in)existence of structural unemployment in the Croatian labour market; and (2) is the
use of occupation categories a good proxy for skills? Even though not quite clear from
the presented analysis, the answer to both of these questions is yes. As explained earlier,
this is the best grouping of occupations available from the CES statistics, while the ques-
tion of the use of occupations as a proxy for skills is justiﬁable on the grounds that more
sophisticated occupations usually imply higher educational achievement (see Table 1).
5. Conclusions
This article studies the importance of structural unemployment in the Croatian labour
market through estimation of the matching function that incorporates the effect of occu-
pational mismatch on the ﬂow of ﬁlled vacancies. According to the obtained results it
appears that occupational mismatch does not have signiﬁcant impact on the aggregate
ﬂow of ﬁlled vacancies, i.e. on the matching process in the overall labour market. How-
ever, when the labour market is examined through its submarkets, i.e. similar occupa-
tional groups, occupational mismatch seems to have an inﬂuence on the matching
process in these (sub)markets. Namely, occupational mismatch (signiﬁcantly) positively
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affects the matching process in the market for white-collars, while it has negative (insig-
niﬁcant) impact in the (sub)market for blue-collar occupations. In addition, for both the
overall labour market as well as for each of the submarkets (occupational groups) the
share of the users of unemployment beneﬁts in total unemployment has a negative
impact on the matching process, while time trend positively affects the matching process
which indicates that Croatia is experiencing greater matching efﬁciency in the labour
market over time. Moreover, in most of the cases the hypothesis of constant returns to
scale cannot be rejected.
Nonetheless, the fraction of total (aggregate) unemployment that can be attributed to
occupational mismatch is estimated to be between 1% and 6%, depending on the time
period. This number is pretty low to be able to explain the high and persistent unem-
ployment in Croatia. The fraction of unemployment attributed to mismatch in different
submarkets varies greatly; from 2% to 20% in the white-collar submarket and only up
to 1% for blue-collar occupations. If there were no (occupational) mismatch in the Cro-
atian labour market, the unemployment rate would fall by roughly 0.2 to 0.8 percentage
points. Hence, the general conclusion is that occupational mismatch has some impact on
the matching process in (occupational) submarkets, while its effect on the level of over-
all unemployment is not very important.
What do these ﬁndings tell us with respect to policy implications? Taking the
obtained results from this article, together with some previous ﬁndings (Obadić, 2005,
2006a, 2006b), it seems that mismatch between supply and demand in the labour market
is not a predominant factor in explaining unemployment in Croatia. This is especially
true in the time of economic crisis, when deﬁcient demand serves as a primary factor in
explaining high and persistent unemployment. However, this does not mean that struc-
tural unemployment is not an issue, since the existing works present just ‘the tip of the
iceberg’ in this area. Still, in order to propose concrete policy measures, further research
concerning mismatch in the Croatian labour market is needed.
Notes
1. It has been argued that Croatia went through a somewhat different path in this process in
comparison to other CEE economies due to the existence of some form of market economy
already in the 1980s as well as due to the impact of civil war in the early 1990s. For details,
see Bićanić and Babić (2008).
2. Fahr and Sunde (2004) argue that the results on the aggregate level are of little help when
trying to target certain labour market interventions to certain groups of workers or ﬁrms in
order to maximise their impact.
3. A comprehensive overview of the literature regarding skills mismatch is given in Quintini
(2011).
4. See, for instance, Barlevy (2011), Estevao and Tsounta (2011), Cotti and Drewianka (2012),
or Sahin, Song, Topa, and Violante (2012).
5. I.e. they represent the ﬂow (as opposed to stock) variable.
6. Based on International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO). Military occupations
are left out of the analysis since in some of the periods there were no registered unemployed
or vacancies in this group. Perhaps a more detailed categorisation of occupations would
bring more information. However, due to its speciﬁc construction, the next categorisation
provides too detailed grouping of occupations which means that many of these groups do
not have any open vacancies or even any unemployed in many of the months studied in the
article and thus it could not be used in the empirical estimation.
7. Legislators, senior ofﬁcials and managers; skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers; and plant
and machine operators and assemblers, with shares in total employment and vacancies of less
than 10%.
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8. For more details, refer to Appendix.
9. For more details, see Dur (1999).
10. In Dur (1999), instruments used in the model were, besides lagged endogenous variables,
the logs of capacity utilisation, the tax wedge, consumer minus producer prices, the size of
the working-age population and the capital stock. Unfortunately, data for most of these vari-
ables are not available in Croatia, especially on a monthly basis. Details on the ‘appropriate-
ness’ (Hausman and Sargan tests) of the used instruments are available in Appendix.
11. Šergo et al. (2009) show that the improvement of the matching efﬁciency in Croatia has
been rising since the war and the de-industrialisation shocks in the 1990s which indicates
that Croatia is experiencing greater matching efﬁciency in the labour market over time.
12. Remember that in the empirical equation (equation 5) the coefﬁcient for the mismatch index
is expressed as (1 − ξ).
13. We also estimated the unrestricted model. Those estimations suggest that the mismatch index
does not have a (statistically) signiﬁcant impact on the process of matching. However, for
both white- and blue-collar submarkets the results suggest a negative impact of occupational
mismatch on the process of matching. Additionally, in most of the cases the null hypothesis
about constant returns to scale (α + β = 1) cannot be rejected. Results are available upon
request.
14. Obadić (2006a, 2006b) calculated the ‘implicit’ regional mismatch indicator using arbitrary
coefﬁcients of elasticities (both α and β were set to 0.50) and she obtained values for the
regional mismatch indicator ranging from 2% to 4% in the period 1993–2002.
15. For instance, Jurajda and Terrell (2009) explain how within-country regional variation in
inherited human capital in four transition economies (Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria
and Ukraine) accounts for the bulk of regional variation in unemployment.
16. The analysis is done on a NUTS2 instead of a NUTS3 level since there were no data for
speciﬁc occupations in many months in the latter, and thus the estimation (that uses loga-
rithms) could not have been conducted.
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Appendix 1: More details about derivations of equations 3, 4 and 5
Perfect structural balance
Matching function,M (·), is by assumption convex, liner homogeneous function, so it can be written in
a following form:Mi ¼ Vif ðUiViÞ, where f’ > 0, f’’ < 0 and index i stands for occupation in this case.
If there is no structural unemployment, the existing number of unemployed, given the pattern
of vacancies, should maximise aggregate hires, i.e. maxM ¼ maxPi Mi ¼ maxPi Vif ðUiViÞ;
s.t.
P
i Ui = U = const.\Vi − given. First order condition gives: f ’ðUiViÞ = const. which provides the
deﬁnition of the structural balance where the ratio of unemployment to vacancies is equalised
across submarkets (Jackman & Roper, 1987).
Mismatch indicator
It needs to be pointed out that the result from equation 4 holds only in the case of α + β = 1, i.e.
if the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale. Namely, in perfect structural balance
(S) it holds that
P
i ðUiU Þ
aðViV Þb ¼ 1 as well as that USVS ¼ UV , which also gives the following result:
US
U ¼ VSV . In deriving the equation 4, all the preceding assumptions are equally important.
By substituting the appropriate expressions for MS and M into MS = M we get:
kUaS V
b
S ¼ kUaV b
P
i ðUiU Þ
aðViV Þb. Next, dividing both sides by Ua and by V b (and k) we obtain:
ðUSU ÞaðVSV Þb ¼
P
i ðUiU Þ
aðViV Þb. Replacing VSV by USU leads us to ðUSU ÞaðUSU Þb ¼
P
i ðUiU Þ
aðViV Þb after which
one gets the relationship between perfect structural balance unemployment (US) and actual unem-
ployment (U), but only if the assumption that α + β = 1, i.e. β = 1 - α holds.
In case the assumption about constant returns to scale does not hold the relationship between
perfect structural balance unemployment (US) and actual unemployment (U) is:
US ¼ U
P
i ðUiU Þ
a
aþbðViV Þ
b
aþb. However, if we stick to the assumption from the original model
(α + β = 1) the difference between actual unemployment and perfect structural balance unemploy-
ment is equal to equation 4.
Empirical counterpart of equation 3
Evidently, the equation 5 is slightly more ﬂexible than the exact counterpart of equation 3. It
would look like: logM ¼ const: þPj kj log kj þ a logU þ b logV þ flogPi ðUiU ÞaðViV Þb þ e.
However, if we want to follow the procedure from the original paper (Dur, 1999), where the
author stresses that he does not initially enforce constant returns to scale nor a unitary coefﬁcient
for the mismatch index, we will stick to equation 5 in our estimation too.
Appendix 2: Instruments
In this part we show some details about the instrumental variable estimation, i.e. choosing the
‘appropriate’ instruments and evaluating their ‘appropriateness’.
Correlation matrix
Table A.1 shows correlation coefﬁcients between endogenous variables (unemployed, vacancies
and the share of the users of the unemployment beneﬁts in total unemployment) and potential
instruments.
As is evident from the table variables that are highly (negatively) correlated with the unem-
ployment variables are indices for the state of the economy in different areas: construction, indus-
trial production, retail trade or the ofﬁcial Zagreb Stock Exchange share index. In addition, the
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share of the average net in the average gross wage is also correlated with the unemployment vari-
ables. In this case, we chose the index of construction works as an instrument for the unemploy-
ment variables being that in most of the observed period (2004–2011) construction sector was the
‘driving force’ of the Croatian economy. Moreover, from Table A.1 one can observe that this
index is not correlated with the matching variable. In the case of vacancies – none of the observa-
ble variables is highly correlated with the number of vacancies on a monthly basis (apart from the
number of opened vacancies for seasonal employment). Still, there are some variables that are
pretty correlated with (aggregate) vacancies and not with the number of hirings (like the index of
construction works or the share of net in gross wage). For the share of the users of the unemploy-
ment beneﬁts in total unemployment the most correlated variable is the spread between interest
rates on short-term loans for enterprises and interest rates on foreign currency deposits for enter-
prises. This variable is not correlated with the number of hirings/matchings, and it is only slightly
correlated with the number of vacancies, and could serve as a good instrument.
Hausman test
This test usually evaluates the signiﬁcance of an estimator versus an alternative estimator. In this
case, we test the potential endogeneity of regressors by comparing LS and IV (TSLS) estimator.
The null hypothesis says that the potentially endogenous regressors (u, v and unben) are actually
exogenous, i.e. both the LS and IV estimators are consistent (Greene, 2008). In this case we use
the so-called variable addition test as explained in Greene (2008). In the ﬁrst step we regress all
three variables – u, v and unben – onto the all exogenous regressors (including all the instru-
ments) and save the (estimated) residuals from each of the three regressions. The endogenous
regressor is exogenous in the case if these residuals are not correlated with residuals from the ori-
ginal speciﬁcation (regression).
Since we do not have information about the residuals from the original speciﬁcation, in the
second step we regress the dependent variable from the model (m) that should be correlated with
the residuals from the original speciﬁcation onto the all the variables from the original model plus
Table A.1. Correlation coefﬁcients between endogenous variables and potential instruments.
utot u_wc u_bc vtot v_wc v_bc mtot m_wc m_bc unben
construction -0.79 -0.81 -0.68 0.37 -0.03 0.42 0.19 -0.03 0.25 -0.13
industrial production -0.61 -0.56 -0.57 0.37 -0.01 0.41 0.35 0.29 0.34 -0.30
retail trade -0.70 -0.50 -0.74 0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.24 0.14 0.25 -0.37
net/gross wage 0.65 0.69 0.54 -0.35 0.02 -0.39 0.02 0.10 -0.02 -0.15
cpi-ppi -0.19 -0.44 -0.01 -0.07 -0.34 0.03 -0.18 -0.42 -0.09 -0.02
crobex -0.54 -0.55 -0.47 0.33 0.03 0.35 0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.32
export-import -0.59 -0.43 -0.62 0.39 0.11 0.39 0.35 0.45 0.29 -0.22
newly registered
unemployed
0.23 0.37 0.12 -0.42 0.27 -0.55 -0.47 -0.01 -0.58 0.30
seasonal vacancies 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.79 0.05 0.86 0.53 0.31 0.56 0.27
spread1 0.36 0.50 0.24 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.14 0.21 0.11 0.34
spread2 0.49 0.72 0.29 -0.29 0.07 -0.34 0.06 0.22 0.00 0.53
Notes: u_tot – total unemployment; u_wc – white-collar unemployment; u_bc – blue-collar unemployment
(same goes for v – vacancies and m – matchings); unben – the share of the users of unemployment beneﬁts in
total unemployment; construction – monthly index of construction works; industrial production – monthly
index of industrial production; retail trade – monthly index of retail trade; net/gross wage – monthly share of
the average net in the average gross wage; cpi-ppi – consumers minus produces price index; crobex – monthly
Zagreb Stock Exchange share index; export-import – monthly index of exports of goods minus imports of
goods; newly registered unemployed – monthly number of newly registered unemployed that came directly
from employment; seasonal vacancies – vacancies for seasonal employment; spread1 – spread between interest
rates on long-term loans for enterprises and interest rates on foreign currency time deposits for enterprises;
spread2 – spread between interest rates on short-term loans for enterprises and interest rates on foreign cur-
rency deposits for enterprises.
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data.
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the residuals from the ﬁrst step. If the coefﬁcient for the residuals in this second step is signiﬁ-
cant, we have endogenous regressors in the original speciﬁcation and must proceed with IV
(TSLS) estimation. Table A.2 shows estimated coefﬁcients for residuals in the second step. In
addition, F-statistics is also shown. As is evident from the tables, in some cases the coefﬁcients
for residuals are signiﬁcant while in others (especially for vacancies) are not.
Test of over-identifying restrictions
Test of over-identifying restrictions is often called Sargan or Hansen test. It is based on the
assumption that if the instruments are really exogenous then the residuals (from TSLS IV estima-
tion) should be uncorrelated with the exogenous variables (Table A.3). The over-identifying
restrictions test statistic can be calculated as N*R2 (the number of observations multiplied by the
coefﬁcient of determination) from the LS regression of the residuals onto the set of exogenous
variables (including instruments). This statistic will be asymptotically chi-squared under the null
hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with the instruments, i.e. that all the instruments are
exogenous. Test statistic has q, or in our case 3(6), degrees of freedom (number of instruments –
number of endogenous regressors). Table A.3 shows values of the test statistic (N*R2) for each of
the models estimated before. One can observe that in most of the cases the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected.
Appendix 3: Robustness check
This part presents some of the mentioned alternative calculations for the model presented in the
main text. This is not robustness check as understood usually in the literature; it is more of a ‘nor-
mative robustness check’ where some alternatives to the existing calculations as well as some new
calculations are presented.
Table A.2. Hausman speciﬁcation test.
aggregate function white-collars blue-collars
unrestricted restricted unrestricted restricted unrestricted restricted
res1 -4.325*** -4.299*** -1.441** -0.945 -5.211*** -4.559***
(-4.094) (-3.526) (-2.284) (-1.066) (-3.921) (-3.227)
res2 0.327*** 0.257** -0.081 -0.879*** 0.051 0.188
(3.448) (2.367) (-0.486) (-4.364) (0.441) (1.152)
res3 -0.827 -0.497*** -1.097 -4.764*** -1.909** -1.240
(-1.328) (-2.525) (-1.008) (-2.651) (-2.411) (-1.542)
F-statistics 60.090*** 60.869*** 26.718*** 14.144*** 78.097*** 69.601***
Notes: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. t-statistics is in parentheses. res1 – residuals from the regression of
u onto the all exogenous regressors; res2 – residuals from the regression of v onto the all exogenous regres-
sors; res3 – residuals from the regression of unben onto the all exogenous regressors.
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data.
Table A.3. Test of over-identifying restrictions (Sargan test).
aggregate function white-collars blue-collars
unrestricted restricted unrestricted restricted unrestricted restricted
N*R2 7.802 6.956 3.008 5.922 −10.058 12.502
Notes: chi-squared (3, 0.05)=7.82; chi-squared (3, 0.01)=11.35; chi-squared (3, 0.001)=16.27; (q=3, i.e. num-
ber of instruments-number of endogenous regressors).
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data.
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Table A.4. Estimation results for the restricted estimation – region effect.
Fixed-effects panel estimation NLS – dummy variable estimation
aggregate
function
white-
collars
blue-
collars
aggregate
function
white-
collars
blue-
collars
α 0.766*** 0.849*** 0.794*** 0.663*** 0.734*** 0.689***
(28.793) (23.584) (31.301) (9.834) (11.072) (9.524)
β 0.234 0.151 0.206 0.337 0.266 0.311
( – ) ( – ) ( – ) ( – ) ( – ) ( – )
ξ -1.506* -1.064 2.244 -1.105* 0.201 0.562
(-1.805) (-1.572) (8.113) (-1.904) (0.351) (0.192)
time trend 0.002* 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.007*** -0.0003
(1.706) (3.003) (0.684) (1.045) (4.231) (-0.257)
reg_dummy_1 – – – 0.013 -0.079* 0.050
( – ) ( – ) ( – ) (0.234) (-1.780) (0.768)
reg_dummy_2 – – – 0.089 -0.055 0.131*
( – ) ( – ) ( – ) (1.241) (-0.872) (1.738)
constant -2.783*** -2.837*** -3.085*** -2.262*** −2.391*** -2.517***
(-23.267) (-19.202) (-24.891) (-9.330) (-10.912) (-9.281)
R2 0.781 0.654 0.835 0.821 0.656 0.867
redundant ﬁxed-
effects test
0.327 10.715*** 0.527 – – –
cross-section
effect 1
0.030 -0.003 0.039 – – –
cross-section
effect 2
0.002 0.079 -0.009 – – –
cross-section
effect 3
-0.031 -0.076 -0.030 – – –
Notes: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. t-statistics is in parentheses. NLS – non-linear least squares.
Monthly dummies are statistically signiﬁcant, detailed results available upon request. Redundant ﬁxed-effects
test tests the joint signiﬁcance of the ﬁxed effects estimates in least squares speciﬁcations where null hypothe-
sis says that the cross-section effects are redundant (F-statistics is shown). reg_dummy_1- Adriatic Croatia;
reg_dummy_2 – Central and Eastern (Pannonian) Croatia. cross-section effect 1 – Adriatic Croatia; cross-sec-
tion effect 2 – Northwest Croatia; cross-section effect 3 – Central and Eastern (Pannonian) Croatia.
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data.
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Table A.5. Estimation results for the restricted estimation – different set of instruments.
Aggregate function White-collars Blue-collars
TSNLS1 TSNLS2 TSNLS1 TSNLS2 TSNLS1 TSNLS2
α 0.817*** 0.877*** 0.734*** 0.664*** 0.850*** 0.965***
(15.601) (12.253) (13.002) (8.148) (11.320) (10.032)
β 0.183 0.123 0.266 0.336 0.150 0.035
( – ) ( – ) ( – ) ( – ) ( – ) ( – )
ξ -1.191 -0.921 -1.305** -1.158* 1.999 20.300
(-1.417) (-0.705) (-2.349) (-1.935) (0.416) (0.306)
time trend 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.003***
(5.965) (5.583) (7.728) (5.871) (3.064) (3.556)
unben -1.387*** -1.859*** -1.605*** -1.723*** -1.336*** -1.917***
(-4.483) (-4.200) (-5.164) (-3.662) (-3.293) (-3.606)
constant -5.107*** -6.032*** -4.808*** -4.741*** -5.319*** -6.604***
(-9.027) (-7.153) (-8.680) (-5.091) (-6.594) (-6.090)
R2 0.911 0.907 0.824 0.818 0.919 0.914
res1 7.98e12 0.926 -3.81e11** -0.096 -1.62e12** 0.087
(0.446) (0.862) (-2.581) (-0.345) (-2.054) (0.245)
res2 -1.75e07 -0.636* -4.65e11** 0.184 -9.19e12 0.339***
(-0.128) (-1.881) (-2.426) (1.325) (-1.467) (2.956)
res3 8.88e07 -2.449 7.55e09 1.395*** 5.10e08 1.301**
(0.064) (-1.569) (1.651) (3.116) (0.493) (2.180)
F-statistics 52.493*** 11.800*** 26.866*** 20.471*** 60.736*** 63.671***
N*R2 2.162 4.606 10.355 14.852 11.305 17.766
Notes: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. t-statistics is in parentheses. unben – natural logarithm of the share
of the users of unemployment beneﬁts in total unemployment. Monthly dummies are statistically signiﬁcant,
detailed results available upon request. TSNLS1 – two-stage NLSs with endogenous variables: unemployment,
vacancies and the share of the users of unemployment beneﬁts and instruments: within-transformed endoge-
nous variables plus log of monthly index of construction works; log of monthly share of the average net in the
average gross wage and log of the spread between interest rates on short-term loans for enterprises and interest
rates on foreign currency deposits for enterprises. TSNLS1 – two-stage NLSs with endogenous variables:
unemployment, vacancies and the share of the users of unemployment beneﬁts and instruments: ﬁrst-differ-
enced endogenous variables plus log of monthly index of construction works; log of monthly share of the
average net in the average gross wage and log of the spread between interest rates on short-term loans for
enterprises and interest rates on foreign currency deposits for enterprises. res1 – residuals from the regression
of u onto the all exogenous regressors; res2 – residuals from the regression of v onto the all exogenous regres-
sors; res3 – residuals from the regression of unben onto the all exogenous regressors. chi-squared (3, 0.05)
=7.82; chi-squared (3, 0.01)=11.35; chi-squared (3, 0.001)=16.27; (q=3, i.e. number of instruments-number of
endogenous regressors).
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data.
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